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A near-consensus position in modern macroeconomics is that policy rules have greater 
advantage over discretion in improving economic performance. For developing countries in 
particular, simple instrument rules appear to be feasible options as pre-requisites since  more 
sophisticated targeting rules are generally lacking. Using Pakistan’s data, this study has 
attempted to estimate the Taylor rule and use it as monetary policy strategy to simulate the 
economy. Our results indicate that the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has not been following the 
Taylor rule. In fact, the actual policy has been an extreme deviation from it. On the other hand, 
counterfactual simulation confirms that macroeconomic performance could have been better  in 
terms of stability of inflation and output, had the Taylor rule been adopted as monetary policy 
strategy. The study also establishes that further gains are possible if the parameter values of the 
rule are slightly modified.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
A near-consensus position in modern macroeconomics is that policy rules have 
greater advantage over discretion in improving economic performance [Taylor (1993)]. 
Through seminal papers, Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) have 
convincingly shown that discretionary policies are time inconsistent. However, the 
adverse outcome can be avoided if private agents pursue a punishment policy of higher 
inflationary expectations that may cause loss of reputation of the monetary authority 
[Barro and Gordon (1983a)]. Alternatively, ensuring independence of the Central Bank 
may also reduce inflationary bias [Sargent and Wallace (1981), Rogoff (1985), Alesina 
and Summers (1993), and Walsh (1995) among others]. 
Interestingly, despite this overwhelming support initially for money growth 
targeting and later for inflation targeting, it was not clear how a rule could be used in 
practical policy formulation process until Taylor (1993) presented a state-contingent 
interest rate rule that is both, practicable and simple.1 It calls for changes in the short-
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term interest rate (monetary policy instrument) in response to deviation of output from 
trend or potential level and that of inflation from the target with equal weight given to 
both these objectives in the policy reaction function. Taylor argues that adoption of the 
simple rule not only has the potential of improving macroeconomic performance, it also 
avoids the time inconsistency problem. He further maintains that the rule does not suffer 
from enforcement problem because of its easy verifiability by agents outside the central 
bank. In this context, commitment to this rule becomes technically feasible.  
The purpose of the present study is to revalidate the Taylor rule by estimating it for 
Pakistan. It needs to be established whether or not the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP)—the 
Monetary Authority—has been following such a policy rule for the simple reason that 
historically Pakistan has experienced cycles in inflation and real economic activity. 
Inflation reached its peak of 23 percent in 1974, and touched the lowest level of 2.4 
percent in 2002. Similarly, the real output growth varied between 8.7 percent in 1980 and 
–0.1 percent in 1997.2  Besides this inconsistent macroeconomic performance, Pakistan’s 
economy also suffered from weak institutional set -up. Not only that the independence of 
the central bank was continuously challenged, it also had to withstand regular fiscal 
pressures which largely weakened the monetary policy stance. Furthermore, there was a 
constant struggle for maintaining stability of the exchange rate.  
Given these weaknesses, one would have argued that adoption of a simple 
instrument rule—like the Taylor rule—might have been a natural and feasible option. 
Given this perspective, the second objective of the study is to assess the macroeconomic 
performance on the basis of variability of inflation and output. For this purpose, the 
economy has been simulated, with and without Taylor rule, as monetary policy strategy. 
Finally, using counterfactual simulations, the study also investigates whether the 
parameter values of the Taylor rule (the weights on output and inflation stabilisation, and 
the inflation target) are optimal for Pakistan or some modification is needed to have 
better results. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, the two types of monetary policy 
rules, namely the instrument rules and the targeting rules, are defined and explained. The 
methodology for estimation, backcasting, and counterfactual simulation is presented in 
Section 3. An exhaustive discussion of empirical findings is the subject matter of Section 
4. The final section summarises the main findings and offers insights for further research. 
 
2.  MONETARY POLICY RULES 
A monetary policy rule can be defined as a description—expressed algebraically, 
numerically, and/or graphically—of how the instruments of policy, such as monetary 
base or the discount rate, change in response to economic variables [Taylor (1999b)]. 
Policy rules are similar to constant growth rate rules for money supply. However, in a 
broader sense, feedback rules such as money supply response to changes in 
unemployment and/or inflation etc. are preferred policy rules. As indicated, there is a 
near-consensus among macroeconomists that policy rules have greater advantage over 
discretion in improving economic performance. This, however, requires that the rule is 
 
2It may be recalled that a country cannot graduate from low-income to middle-income status unless it 
registers a long period of high and sustained growth where the stability of prices is also ensured [Fischer 
(1993)]. 
Taylor Rule and Macroeconomic Performance 
 
39
adopted and followed for a reasonably long period of time to reap the benefits of 
stabilisation and the credibility associated with the rule. The literature related to rules 
versus discretion debate distinguishes between simple instrument rules [proposed by 
McCallum (1988); Taylor (1993) and others] and targeting rules due largely to Svensson 
(1997, 2002, 2003). The choice between the two reduces to such concerns as simplicity, 
robustness, reliability, practicability, technical feasibility, result-orientation and the role 
of policy-maker’s judgment in decision-making. We begin with a brief review of the two 
rules. 
Instrument Rules: Instrument rules are state-contingent reaction functions that link 
the policy tool with performance indicators of the economy [Meltzer (1987), McCallum 
(1988), Taylor (1993), and Henderson and McKibbin (1993)]. These rules are simple to 
follow and require little amount of information. These are robust and technically feasible in 
the sense that commitment to rule is easily verifiable. Of different variants, the one that has 
attracted most of the attention during 1990s has been the Taylor (1993) rule. Taylor offered an 
instrument rule to conduct monetary policy operations by setting the target for federal funds 
rate (operational target) equal to an ‘equilibrium’ real funds rate plus the current inflation and 
adding to it a weighted average of monetary authority’s response to the deviation of current 
inflation from the target and percentage deviation of the real GDP from an estimate of its 
potential or full-employment level. He considered it to be an ‘optimal’ policy as it relates a 
plausible instrument to reasonable goal variables and performs reasonably well in a variety of 
macroeconomic models.3  The rule can be described by the following equation: 
)( *21
*  tttt yri  … … … … (1) 
where r* is the long-run equilibrium real interest rate, t is the current inflation rate (Taylor 
takes this as last four quarters average inflation including the current quarter), * is the target 
inflation rate, and yt is the deviation of output in period t from its long-run trend. The 
restrictions on the coefficients to have macroeconomic stability are: 1 > 0 and 2 > 0. 
Supposing that the coefficient on inflation deviation is less than zero, then a rise in inflation 
would lead to an interest rate cut, which will induce increased spending. In turn, this would 
tend to increase aggregate demand, thereby increasing the inflation further (an unstable 
solution). On the other hand, if it is greater than zero then this instability does not arise, 
because then the rule ensures that inflation is equal to its targeted value * [Taylor (1999a)].  
Targeting Rules: Some of the central banks adopted an elaborate framework to 
keep inflation on target and output on track during the 1990s. To start with, this 
framework was not ‘tightly’ supported by academic research. However, it recovered from 
this deficiency with the evolution of literature on ‘inflation targeting’ or ‘inflation 
forecast targeting’ [Svensson (1997)]. The revised framework starts with a rule that 
allows some discretion to the central bankers. Hence it was also regarded as ‘constrained 
discretion’ by Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and targeting rule by Svensson (2002). It 
proceeds like this. The central bank announces a numerical inflation target (point target 
or target range) and monetary policy has a legislated mandate for achieving this target 
with clear instrumental independence. There is a high degree of monetary policy 
transparency and accountability of concerned authorities. The inflation forecast is taken 
as the intermediate target.  
 
3This indicates the robustness of the rule. 
Malik and Ahmed 
 
40
Within targeting rules, a further distinction is made between ‘general targeting 
rule’ and ‘specific targeting rule’. While the former specifies an operational loss function, 
which the monetary policy is committed to minimise, in the case of the latter a condition 
for setting the instrument is specified, e.g., marginal rate of transformation and 
substitution between the target variables is equalised. It gives an implicit reaction 
function of the monetary authority that need not be announced. According to this 
framework, central banks collect large amount of data and use a complex policy 
formulation to set the path of instrument.4  The rule has a good theoretical base as there is 
no ad hoc representation of reaction function. Here the condition for instrument path is 
described by optimal first order Euler conditions and the central bank behaviour is not 
modeled in a mechanical way. There is also a clear role of judgment in the formulation 
and implementation of monetary policy [Svensson (2005)]. 
 
3.  MODEL SPECIFICATION AND METHODOLOGY 
Ever since the introduction of the Taylor rule, three issues that have occupied 
much space in research are positive analysis of central banks’ strategy to control 
inflation, robustness of rule to changes in transmission mechanism and ex-post 
macroeconomic performance once the rule is adopted. As indicated, the objective of the 
present study is not to identify the policy reaction function of SBP, instead our focus is 
on drawing a comparison of actual policy with the one suggested by the Taylor rule. We 
are also interested in knowing whether the economic performance would have improved 
had the Taylor rule been followed. 
Starting with the first objective, the issue can be addressed either by invoking the 
standard regression techniques or through a simple comparison of the actual and the 
simulated data similar to one used by Taylor (1993). Regarding the first option, let us re-
specify the Taylor rule as: 
it = r* + t + 1yt + *2  (t – *)  … … … … … (2) 
where  
 r* – Long run equilibrium real interest rate. 
 it    – Short interest rate taken as monetary policy instrument. 
 t  – Average inflation over previous four quarters including the current one. 
 yt  – Output gap calculated as percentage deviation of actual output from the 
normal level. 
 * – Long run inflation target of the central bank. 
There are four parameters, r*, *, 1 and *2  in expression 2. The values of these 
parameters adopted by Taylor were: 2 percent, 2 percent, 0.5 and 0.5, respectively. 
Following in Taylor’s footsteps, we have also assumed that the central bank has 
information on current output and inflation. 
The above rule (expression 2) can easily be converted into an estimable form as 
ttt yi  210  … … … … … … (3) 
 
4Examples of such policy formulation are the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Bank of England.   
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where ** 20  r   and )1( *22   
It is contended that if the SBP strictly follows the rule then parameter values 
should be 0 = 1, 1 = 0.5 and 2 = 1.5, and if it is not then 1 > 0 and 2 > 1 must hold, 
otherwise the system would be unstable. It is relevant to point out that the second 
condition is referred to as ‘Taylor Principle’ in the literature [Taylor (1999) and 
Woodford (2001)].  
Expression 3 can be estimated by OLS if time-series properties are satisfied. 
Otherwise the results are not consistent [Enders (2004)].5 For super consistency of the 
OLS estimates even in the case of non-stationary variables, the estimated residuals have 
to be stationary. To enforce these constraints, the model parameters in the present study 
are estimated after testing the presence or otherwise of unit root in the estimated residuals 
of the equation. In the second step, the short term interest rate is simulated with actual 
data on output and inflation assuming the Taylor rule as monetary policy strategy. The 
conjecture is that if the central bank has been following the Taylor rule, then both actual 
and simulated series should be close to each other showing similar behaviour and the 
same basic statistics like mean, range, standard deviation etc. It may, however, be added 
that even though Taylor (1993) has used this approach to evaluate the Fed’s policy, this 
method is somewhat less sophisticated. It can, nonetheless, perform well in identifying 
the behaviour of monetary policy instrument.  
To accomplish the second objective of the study, the economy needs to be 
simulated with and without the Taylor rule as monetary policy strategy to assess the 
macroeconomic performance on the basis of variability in inflation and output and the 
loss to society. This analysis is undertaken for historical as well as stochastic simulation. 
In this regard, some issues need further elaboration. The first relates to macroeconomic 
model on the basis of which the economy is to be simulated. The literature highlights 
three types of transmission mechanisms emanating from the Lucas-type expectations-
augmented Phillips curve model, Neo-Keynesian model, or the New-Keynesian model 
[Cukierman (2002)]. The estimation of the first and the third model not only requires the 
assumption of rational expectations, one also needs to have knowledge of prior values of 
some of the parameters for model calibration. Since the rational expectations hypothesis 
has not yet been tested in Pakistan, and also no earlier studies are available to provide 
prior values of the parameters, the obvious choice for the present study has been 
restricted to the use of the Neo-Keynesian type model suggested by Svensson (1997) and 
estimated by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). According to Svensson (1997) the model 
although simple, has reasonably sound theoretical properties and captures the essential 
features of more elaborate models which some of the central banks use for policy 
analysis. The model is backward looking and assumes price rigidity in the economy.6 It 
can be described by the following two equations along with the central bank’s reaction 
function given as expression 3, 
ttttt uiyy   )( 11211   … … … … … (4) 
 
5Other techniques like Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS), Generalised Method of Moments (GMM), and 
Vector Autoregression (VAR) etc. may improve estimation efficiency, but it would be at the cost of loss of 
rule’s theory, as the rule specifies interest rate as a linear function of output gap and inflation.  
6In the case of Pakistan, inertia in output and inflation is consistent with VAR study by Malik (2006). 
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tttt y   1211   … … … … … … (5) 
The parameter restrictions are: 0 < β1 < 1, β2 < 0, 0 < γ1 > 1, and γ2 > 0. Since 
prices are assumed to be rigid, the central bank can affect aggregate demand through 
changes in the real interest rate. Output is affected by one period lagged real interest rate 
and its effect on inflation is indirect and takes effect after one period. This model can be 
estimated by OLS as long as the variables under consideration are stationary and there is 
no cross and contemporaneous correlation between the residuals of the equations in the 
model. If the variables are non-stationary, then this property can be imposed in the 
estimation and restricted OLS can be used to estimate the model [Rudebusch and 
Svensson (1999)]. Furthermore, if there is contemporaneous correlation across the 
equations, then the system needs to be estimated as a Seemingly Unrelated (SUR) model.  
The final objective of the study concerns finding the optimal parameter values of 
the rule for Pakistan. This has been done by back-casting the economy with different 
combinations of the parameters in the rule and then comparing the results. The optimal 
set of parameters is the one that decreases output and inflation variability and hence 
minimises the loss to society. The expression 6 in the following describes the loss 
function which is defined over the variances of output gap and inflation respectively. 
Ł = ½ [var (yt) + α var (πt)] … … … … … … (6) 
where  is the relative weight assigned by society to inflation. Finally, stochastic 
simulation establishes the statistical significance of the set of parameters. 
 
4.  ESTIMATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Regression Approach 
To see whether the  SBP has been following the Taylor rule, the model has been 
estimated for the period 1991-2006 using quarterly data on call money rate (short interest 
rate taken as monetary policy instrument),7 consumer price index (CPI) as a measure of 
inflation, and real output gap. The results clearly indicate that the actual policy of the 
SBP does not correspond to the Taylor rule. The coefficient of output gap has opposite 
sign while the magnitude of inflation is different than the one prescribed by Taylor 
(1993).8  Since the residual series from this estimated equation is stationary as null of the 
unit root in Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, it is easily rejected at the conventional 
level of significance; therefore, we conclude that the results are super consistent. 
it = 4.34 – 0.38 yt + 0.51 t  … … … … … … (7) 
      (4.28) (–2.28)    (4.17) 
Adjusted R2 = 0.22,  DW= 0.89 
ADF-stats for residuals = –4.11 
There are several points related to these results that need further discussion. 
First, the outcome that the SBP has not been following the Taylor rule should not be 
 
7This is the only interest rate data on which are available for the sample period. Call money rate 
indicates liquidity conditions in the money market and is not directly an indicator of monetary policy stance.  
8t-statistics in parentheses. 
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taken as a surprise it has never claimed to be following such a rule. Not only that the 
policy was ineffective, it was not pursued independently since prior to the 1990s the 
SBP was mainly directed by the government. The monetary authority only got quasi-
independence as a consequence of financial sector reforms initiated during early 
1990s. Since then the job is entrusted to the SBP, but it is being conducted in a fairly 
discretionary manner.  
The second point relates to the coefficient of output gap. According to the estimates, 
the  SBP, over the years, has either raised interest rate or contracted money whenever the 
economy was in the recessionary phase; and this policy was relaxed whenever there was 
inflationary pressure or the output was above trend or the potential level. This outcome not 
only contradicts Taylor (1993), it is difficult to justify also. One possible explanation could be 
that, being the central bank of a developing country, SBP might have resisted leaning against 
the wind assuming that the economy is less elastic to domestic policy changes compared to 
external shocks. Therefore, whenever the economy started to blossom due to exogenous 
factors, the SBP allowed it to do so to keep the momentum going. While this justification 
makes sense only when there is an up-swing, it is less convincing in the opposite case 
scenario, especially raising interest rate during a recession. But to be fair with the monetary 
authority, one cannot rule out the possibility of getting such results in an economy where the 
central bank’s loss function contains monetary policy objectives other than output and 
inflation, implying that the reaction function (expression 7) is mis-specified. 
The third issue is concerned with the coefficient of inflation. According to Taylor 
Principle, the response of the central bank to inflation must be at least one-for-one 
otherwise the system would be divergent. This is so because the central bank’s 
persistence with easy money approach when inflation is above target would mean that 
prices can potentially move without bounds. We have found the coefficient of inflation to 
be substantially less than one. This implies a pro-cyclical response of monetary policy to 
the business cycle.9 Once again this may have been due to the dominance of shocks to the 
economy that were outside the purview of the monetary sector.  
Fourth, the R2 is only 0.22 indicating that only about one-fifth of the variation in 
short interest rate is explained by output gap and inflation. If so, it is essential to identify 
factors, other than output gap and inflation, which play important role in monetary policy. 
It is well established that the monetary authority in Pakistan, like in other developing 
countries, is also worried about exchange rate stability, interest rate smoothing, financial 
sector stability etc. [Malik (2007)]. Thus an extended specification of the model remains 
an alternative option to be considered.  
Finally, the value of Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics indicates a high degree of 
autocorrelation in the residuals of the estimated reaction function. One possible 
implication of this outcome is that the SBP, instead of pursuing a policy consistent with 
the Taylor type rule that might have increased the interest rate volatility, has preferred to 
smooth interest rate.10 Alternatively, it might also be a reflection of a mis-specified model 
where important variables have been omitted.  
 
9SBP, being central bank of a developing country, does not always play a reactionary role. If the 
economy is in boom it may let it go. While in other times it is proactive in stimulating the economy. 
10While alternative variants of the Taylor rule are proposed in the literature to deal with interest rate 
smoothing, the weight on this objective is not yet agreed upon. 
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Simulation Approach 
Using an alternative methodology, it has been shown that the rule-induced and the 
actual short-run interest rate have shown fairly different behaviour (Figure 1 and Table 
1). With the exception of 1997-99 and 2002-04, the latter has lower average level and the 
fluctuations are also not as wild as has been the case with the former. It means that the 
rule would have favoured a more aggressive response to output and inflationary 
fluctuations than the one adopted by the SBP. This is why the level of  variation in the 
actual interest rate has been quite low as compared to the rule-induced interest rate. 
  
Table 1 
Actual and Taylor Rule-induced Short Interest Rate 
  Actual Rule-induced  
Mean 8.24 10.42 
Maximum 15.42 20.30 
Minimum 1.05 0.51 
Range 14.37 19.79 
Variance 11.80 32.96 
St. Deviation 3.44 5.74 
 
Fig. 1.  Actual and the Taylor Rule-induced Short Interest Rate 
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Next, following Judd and Rudebusch (1998), the time-series was divided into three 
sub-samples consistent with the era of three former heads of the SBP to see whether or 
not there was an inclination towards rule-based policy (expressions 8-10). It is quite 
revealing to find that none of the past three Governors of SBP had an appetite for rule- 
based policy during 1991-2006. While there was no consideration for output or inflation 
during 1991-93, the emphasis changed towards growth during 2000-06, probably due to 
the fact that inflation was already too low. The period in the middle had no clear-cut 
policy objective—in fact it could be placed somewhere in between the two policy 
regimes. 
it = 17.04 – 0.60 yt – 0.78 t   (1991-93 period)  … … … (8)  
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it = 8.68 – 0.08 yt – 0.19 t     (1993-99 period)  … … … (9)  
it = 5.77 – 0.18 yt – 0.14 t     (2000-06 period)  … … … (10) 
 
Macroeconomic Performance with Taylor Rule 
One of the important considerations in managing the economy is that there should 
be consistency of policies irrespective of the nature of the rule. As indicated, the 
macroeconomic performance of the economy has been measured by estimating the 
society’s loss function11 where improved macroeconomic performance is defined in terms 
of less inflation and less output variability. It is argued that inflation variability is 
negatively correlated with growth because it generates uncertainty that distorts the 
agents’ major economic decisions like saving and investment [Fischer (1993)]. 
Given this perspective and to accomplish the second objective of the paper, the 
economy has been back-casted for a period ranging between 1992 and 2006 and the 
results are compared with the original Taylor rule (using the original parameter values) 
while the search for the optimal parameter values in the rule is delayed till the next 
subsection.12 Counter-factual simulations require estimation of the transmission mechanism 
(macroeconomic model) of the economy on the basis of which the previous data can be 
regenerated with alternative monetary policy setting. For this purpose, the Neo-Keynesian type 
model for Pakistan has been estimated by OLS. The results of estimation are reported as 
expressions 11 and 12 (with t-statistics in parenthesis).13  
)(27.053.0 111   tttt iyy   … … … … … (11) 
           (4.68)      (–3.96) 
S.E = 1.60,   DW = 2.08 
11 39.051.072.3   ttt y   … … … … … (12) 
                  (3.89)  (4.61)     (1.88)  
S.E = 3.42,          DW = 2.04 
It is evident that the signs of the estimated parameters are consistent with economic 
theory and the coefficient values are also in the acceptable range. Output is affected by its own 
lagged values and the average real interest rate over the previous four quarters. Inflation too has 
one-period inertia and it is also affected by the output gap of the previous quarter. These results 
confirm that, contrary to popular stance held by the central bank, only about one third of inflation 
in Pakistan is explained by monetary factors. Using these results and invoking the assumption 
that the Taylor rule has been the monetary policy strategy, the back-casting exercise of 
the economy was undertaken by incorporating in each period the estimated shocks (to 
output and inflation) from Equations 11 and 12. The striking outcome of this exercise has 
 
11It is assumed that the society puts equal weight to inflation and output stability. 
12The entire process has followed the following course of action. The three-equation model includes 
demand and supply equations and a money reaction function. Here the Taylor rule generates the value of real 
interest rate, which when used in the demand function allows us to determine the value of output y. When 
substituted in the supply function, it generates value of π. The rule based values of y and π are then compared 
with actual values. An outcome is preferred where variations in these variables are low. 
13Results by SUR model and by FIML have been found almost the same as there is insignificant 
contemporaneous correlation between the residuals of the two equations in the model. 
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been that the economy would have performed better if the Taylor rule had been adopted 
rather than sticking with the discretionary policy stance (Table 2). Adoption of the Taylor 
rule would have decreased the variability in output gap and inflation.  
To reconfirm these results further and to avoid over-reliance on historical simulation 
(one time estimates), stochastic simulation has also been carried out. This has been done by 
bootstrapping the standard deviation of output and inflation. The average results of 1000 
trials along with the standard errors of estimates, presented in Table 2, reconfirm the earlier 
results (reduction in output and inflation variability) that continue to hold true even when 
the bootstrapped measure of variation is used. Similarly the probability (p-value) of 
standard deviation of rule based output gap and inflation, being greater than the one found 
in the actual data, is quite low. We have found that in only 20 out of 1000 simulations the 
standard deviation of simulated output gap has been greater than or equal to that of the 
actual data. For inflation series, it was true for 100 simulations. These results again prompt 
us to conclude that the Taylor rule would have performed significantly better than the actual 
policy that was pursued by SBP during 1991-2006.14 
 
Table 2 
Simulation with the Taylor Rule and the Estimated Model 
 
Actual 
Rule Based 
  Historical Stochastic* p-value** 
Interest Rate Average 8.28 9.24   
St Deviation 3.53 3.18   
Output Gap Average –0.24 –0.83   
St Deviation 2.47 1.72 1.80 (0.21) 
(0.21) 
0.002 
Inflation Average 7.36 7.00   
St Deviation 4.31 3.50 4.04 (0.47) 
(0.47) 
0.10 
  *Average of 1000 values of standard deviations in bootstrap simulation. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
** Probability of standard deviation of a variable with rule being greater than that of actual data. 
 
Finding the Optimal Parameter Values for Pakistan 
In an effort to find optimal parameter values (in Taylor rule) for Pakistan, we start with 
the optimal inflation target.  The anecdotal evidence suggests that the central banks that have 
adopted inflation-targeting as monetary policy strategy announce about 2 percent inflation 
target, though with some tolerance range.15 This is in line with Taylor (1993) who advocated 
an inflation target of 2 percent that was consistent with the 2 percent real economic growth of 
the USA. Compared to this, Pakistan being a developing country with a natural requirement 
for higher growth rate, cannot opt for a low real growth (and inflation) target of 2 percent. But 
to avoid ad hocism, we have used seven different inflation target options for simulation 
purpose. To start this process, the 2 percent target was adopted to simulate the economy.  
 
14The comparison of actual and backcasted data on inflation, output-gap and interest rate using Taylor 
rule is given in Appendix A, Figure 2. 
15None of the central banks, with any monetary policy strategy, target zero-inflation as central banks are not 
inflation nutters in King (1997a) terminology. 
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Since Pakistan experienced an average rate of about 5 percent real GDP growth over the 
period 1980-2006, this rate was selected as another option. Similarly, following the empirical 
evidence of Khan and Senhadji (2001) and Mubarik (2005) five values ranging between 7 
percent and 11 percent have also been used.  
The long-run equilibrium real interest rate has been calculated for Pakistan as the 
difference between the average nominal interest rate and inflation over the periods, 1973-
2006, 1981-2006 and 1991-2006 as shown in Table 3.16  Even though the results do not 
portray a clear pattern, nevertheless in all the three periods the average real interest rate 
was found to be close to zero. As a result, the equilibrium value of zero real interest rate 
has been used as benchmark in the counterfactual simulation.  
Finally, the optimal weights for output and inflation in the Taylor rule for Pakistan 
have been estimated. Even though Taylor (1993) used equal weight of 0.5 for both the 
objectives, i.e., output and inflation, we have used this scheme as a starting point only. In 
two subsequent scenarios, either the entire weight was assigned to output stabilisation 
with no regard for inflation deviation or according  more importance to inflation than 
output deviation. While the former alternative could be more attractive for the developing 
countries (at least with asymmetric response) where output was the primary and inflation  
the secondary issue, the latter possibility is obviously more attractive for stable 
economies where more emphasis is on inflation control or price stability.17  
 
Table 3 
Estimation of Long-run Real Interest Rate 
 1973–2006 1981–2006 1991–2006 
Average Interest Rate 8.34 8.01 8.24 
Average CPI Inflation 9.16 7.52 7.89 
Average GDPD Inflation 8.92 8.02 8.92 
Equilibrium Real Interest Rate* –0.82 0.49 0.35 
Equilibrium Real Interest Rate** –0.58 0.00 –0.68 
* When inflation is calculated as percentage growth in CPI. 
** When inflation is calculated as percentage growth in GDP Deflator. 
 
We have taken these three sets of weights and seven different targets of inflation (a 
total of 21 cases) and back-casted the output gap, inflation, and interest rate using 
estimated parameters and shocks in the macroeconomic model comprising equations 11 
and 12. From the results of 21 cases, the best set of parameter values for Pakistan was 
selected on the basis of minimised variability in inflation and output and the minimum 
values of the loss to society. We have found that variability in inflation is a decreasing 
function of the level of inflation target but the variability of output started increasing 
above a certain level of inflation target.  
The first best set of parameter values with which the rule has performed well in 
reducing the variability of inflation and output is the case when the central bank assigns 
 
16Judd and Rudebusch (1998) used this methodology for the U.S. data. 
17It should be noted however that none of the central banks, even the inflation targeting ones, 
practically do this, as inflation targeting is flexible in the sense that central banks put some weight on output 
stabilisation too, [Svensson (1997) and Ball (1999)].  
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equal weights to output and inflation stabilisation in the reaction function and targets 
inflation at 8 percent with zero real interest rate.18 The rule with this set of parameter 
values is given in Equation 13. This roughly indicates the optimal level of inflation for 
Pakistan and the results are consistent with earlier findings of Mubarik (2005) and Khan 
and Senhadji (2001). 
)8(5.05.00  tttt yi  or ttt yi  5.15.04   … … (13) 
The results for the measures of macroeconomic performance by the rule (both in 
case of historical as well as stochastic simulation) with the first best set of parameter values 
are given in Table 4. The procedure adopted here for comparison is the same as discussed 
above for the actual Taylor rule. It is clear that the variability in output gap and inflation 
decreases as we move from discretionary policy towards the Taylor rule when the first best 
set of parameter values for Pakistan are used. However the average values of the variables 
are somewhat greater. To confirm these results, and to find the probability of standard 
deviation of output and inflation in simulated series being greater than that in the actual 
series, we have used stochastic simulation by re-sampling the estimated shocks. The results 
indicate that the variability of both the variables has been lower, even in repeated 
simulation and the probability is also quite low.19  
 
Table 4 
Simulation with the First Best Set of Parameter Values 
  
Actual 
First Best Set  
    Historical Stochastic* p-value** 
Interest Rate Average 8.28 8.08     
St Deviation 3.53 3.11     
Output Gap Average –0.24 0.3     
St Deviation 2.47 1.67 1.72 (0.24) 0.05 
Inflation Average 7.36 7.88     
St Deviation 4.31 3.49 3.91 (0.47) 0.2 
  * Average of 1000 values of standard deviations in bootstrap simulation. 
** Probability of standard deviation of a variable with rule being greater than that of actual data. 
 
The second best set of parameter values was found when the central bank assigned 
one-hundred percent weight to output stabilisation with no response to inflation deviation 
from the target. The implication is that it does not matter what level of inflation is 
optimal to target. Regarding macroeconomic performance by the Taylor rule, the 
parameter values given below in Equation 14 were used.  
*)(00  tttt yi  or ttt yi   … … … … (14) 
 
18The coefficient values are same as proposed by Taylor but inflation target is different. 
19Comparison of actual and simulated data on inflation, output gap and interest rate using this proposed 
rule is given in Appendix A, Figure 3.  
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It can be seen from Table 5 that variability in interest rate, output gap and inflation 
decreased as one moved away from discretionary policy towards the proposed Taylor rule 
for Pakistan. 20,21 The average values of all the three variables are found to be slightly 
greater when the rule is followed. To confirm these results further and to find out whether 
or not the probability of standard deviation of output and inflation in simulated series 
turns out to be greater than that in the actual series, stochastic simulation was used to 
resample the estimated shocks. The outcome confirmed that the variability remained 
lower even in the repeated simulations. It was also found that the probability of standard   
deviation of output and inflation being greater in simulated series than that in the actual 
data, with the rule as monetary policy strategy was quite low.22  
 
Table 5 
Simulation with the Second Best Set of Parameter Values 
  
Actual 
Second Best Set   
    Historical Stochastic* p-value** 
Interest Rate Average 8.28 8.17     
St Deviation 3.53 2.58     
Output Gap Average –0.24 0.25     
St Deviation 2.47 1.55 1.70 (0.20) 0.03 
Inflation Average 7.36 7.84     
St Deviation 4.31 3.62 4.18 (0.48) 0.2 
 * Average of 1000 values of standard deviations in bootstrap simulation. 
** Probability of standard deviation with rule being greater than that of actual data. 
 
Loss Function and Comparison of Parameter Values 
Besides minimising the variability in output and inflation, one can also calculate 
and compare loss to society associated with each set of parameter values as an attractive 
alternative. The loss function not only includes both the objectives, it also takes care of 
the trade off between them. In this respect it can do a better job of finding out the optimal 
parameter values. 
For estimating the loss function, expression 6 has been used. In an effort to ensure 
comparability, the assumption that society assigns equal weight to inflation and output 
has been maintained. Using expressions 11 and 12, the economy has been back-casted for 
21 sets of parameters discussed above, one at a time and the best set of parameters was 
chosen which minimised the loss function. 
The results presented in Table 6 show that the loss is minimum when inflation 
target is set at 8 percent and equal coefficients of output and inflation in the reaction 
function are adopted.  The second best set of parameter values has been found exactly the 
same as was proposed by Taylor. The third best option is found when the entire weight is 
given to real stabilisation in the reaction function. The results of stochastic simulation 
exercise given in Table 6 confirm these findings. It can be seen that the performance of 
 
20By the proposed Taylor rule we mean the rule with parameter values found optimal for Pakistan.  
21Detailed comparison of actual and simulated data on inflation, output gap and interest rate with this 
proposed rule is given in Appendix A, Figure 4. 
22However this probability is higher in case of inflation. 
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the rule (with either set of parameters) is, on average, better than that in case of actual 
policy. The results show that there is very low probability (0.02 in all cases) of loss, 
associated with the rule, being greater than that with actual policy setting. Interestingly, 
Taylor’s proposed parameter values give better results than the second best possibility 
when historical simulation is undertaken but the opposite is true in the case of stochastic 
simulation.  
  
Table 6 
Loss Associated with Different Parameter Values for the Rule 
 Variance Loss to Society  
 Output Inflation Historical Stochastic* p-value** 
Actual Data 6.10 18.54 12.32   
First Best 2.80 12.15 7.48 7.82 
(1.92) 
0.02 
Second Best 2.40 13.11 7.76 8.10 
(1.78) 
0.02 
Taylor Rule 2.94 12.25 7.60 8.26 
(1.72) 
0.02 
  * Standard error in parenthesis. 
** Probability of loss associated with rule being greater than that of actual data. 
 
5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this study the Taylor rule for Pakistan has been estimated for the period 1991-
2006 and for the sub-samples covering the period of three former Governors of SBP. One 
of the important findings of the study is that monetary policy has been generally 
conducted through discretionary measures rather than adopting a rule. This could have 
been due to the SBP’s concentration on policy objectives other than inflation and output 
stabilisation. Through historical and stochastic simulation, the study has concluded that 
commitment to the Taylor-type rule would have significantly improved the 
macroeconomic performance, especially in terms of less variability of output and 
inflation. Regarding parameter values in the rule, it has been found that targeting inflation 
at 8 percent and treating output and inflation equally in the policy reaction function 
would have yielded an optimal scenario for the SBP.23  
The key messages that emerges from the study are as follows:  
First, notwithstanding the fact that the pre-requisites for more elaborate policy 
rules are lacking and the institutional capacity is also quite weak in Pakistan, yet there is 
ample scope to reap benefits by committing to simple instrument rules with a clear 
understanding of the warning issued by McCallum (2000). It is proposed that adoption of 
simple instrument rules may be regarded as a first step for Pakistan and other developing 
countries to move from discretionary policy to a more elaborate inflation targeting 
framework. Second, although there is a need for having an elaborate range of targets in 
the monetary policy framework (including output and inflation), the study is not putting 
any restrictions on these possibilities, i.e., incorporating other objectives in the simple 
 
23These results are based on the assumption of zero real interest rate. 
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rules. However, we recommend a humble beginning as it allows better understanding of 
ground realities. Third, it is also advisable to adjust the parameters in the rule (especially 
the inflation target) according to the economic conditions prevalent in the economy.  
Finally, it may be added that currently this is a passionately pursued area of research in 
macroeconomics. Thus, there is ample scope for further research. To start with, the 
inconclusiveness of literature on the Taylor rule, especially the coefficients of variables other 
than output and inflation in the policy reaction function, can provide further insights for 
developing countries, including Pakistan. There is also a possibility for exploring ways and 
means for adopting a more elaborate inflation targeting framework. In this regard the research 
can focus on the pre-requisites such as central bank independence, and transparency and 
accountability of its actions. These three notions might be the outcome of elaborate policy 
rules and not just the pre-requisites for it. Research in this area would be quite beneficial for 
developing countries where institutions are not yet strong and the focus on issues like 
monetary policy transparency and accountability is generally quite weak.    
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APPENDIX - A  
 Fig. 2. Actual and Taylor Rule-induced Short Interest Rate,  
Output Gap and Inflation  
Actual and Taylor Rule Induced Short Interest Rate
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Actual and Taylor Rule based Output Gap
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Actual and Taylor Rule based Inflation
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Fig. 3.  Actual and First Best Rule-induced Short Interest Rate, 
Output Gap and Inflation 
Actual and Proposed Rule-I based Inflation
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Actual and Proposed Rule-I based Output Gap
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Actual and Best Rule-I based Interest Rate
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Fig. 4. Actual and Second Best Rule-induced Short Interest Rate,  
Output Gap and Inflation  
Actual and Proposed Rule-II based Inflation
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